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The paper contributes to the debate on the stability/efficiency tradeoff of automatic stabilizers. 
A simple AD-AS two-country model is presented and illustrates circumstances where a 
reduction in taxes can foster stabilization. The testable implication from the model is that tax 
cuts can either increase or decrease volatility depending on the structure of the taxation 
system. Hence, lowering taxes for efficiency purposes may have not cost in terms of 
stabilization. This implication is tested for OECD countries over the period 1960-2000 taking 
account of the endogeneity and omitted variables issues identified in the literature. We found 
acceptably robust evidence that the size of governments in OECD countries has played a 
stabilizing role for both output and inflation. However, the relationship between government 
size and macroeconomic stability is not linear. The composition of public finances, in 
particular the tax mix, matters for output and price volatility. Distorting taxes, namely taxes 
on labor, might have negative effects on macroeconomic stability. Consequently, the potential 
trade off between stability and flexibility might not exist. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The economic-policy framework of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is 
characterized by a centralization of monetary policy at the European Central Bank (ECB) 
level and the set up of rules for national authorities on the fiscal policy side. This makes both 
academics and policy makers concerned with the limited ability of individual countries to use 
discretionary fiscal policy to react to national specific shocks (see Buti and Sapir  (2002)). 
The rationale for avoiding discretionary fiscal policy for anti-cyclical purposes may be found 
in its impact on growth and the risk of its use to non-economic purpose. For instance, Fatas 
and Mihof (2002) have documented that discretionary fiscal policy makes economies volatile 
and that such volatility lowers economic growth (0.6 percentage points per additional 
percentage point in volatility). Sapir and Sekkat (2001) have shown that discretionary policy 
has been used, in many instances, for pure electoral purpose. 
With the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) automatic stabilizers become the key mechanisms 
for macroeconomic stabilization
2. Automatic stabilizers are traditionally associated with the 
Keynesian model of business cycles, and are seen as paramount for smoothing business cycle 
fluctuations. Progressive taxation makes disposable income less volatile than income and 
reduces fluctuations in GDP or income. In this framework taxes are always output stabilizing 
and the higher and the more progressive are the taxes the larger will be the smoothness of 
output. However, available evidence suggests that higher and progressive taxation may have 
an adverse impact on economic efficiency. Lucas (1990), focusing on growth, concluded that 
tax changes do alter long-run growth rates, although the quantitative effect seems to be small. 
Caucutt et al. (2003) extended the Lucas model and showed that a decrease in the   5 
progressivity of taxes has a positive effect on growth. Unlike Lucas, they found that the 
quantitative effects of eliminating progressivity can be economically significant. This is 
confirmed by Li and Sarte (2004) who also found a higher impact than in Lucas (1990). 
3 
Even if avoiding discretionary policy, policy makers may, therefore, still face a crucial 
tradeoff between stabilization and efficiency. Reducing the tax burden in order to enhance 
efficiency  may have a cost in terms of less demand smoothing via automatic stabilizers.  
Over the last three decades, total tax burdens (total tax revenues in terms of GDP) in the EU 
have increased markedly to stand at a significantly higher level than in the US. The EU total 
tax burden was more than 10 percentage points higher than in the US (over 40% compared 
with less than 30%). Moreover, over the last three decades, the total tax burden in the EU has 
increased by around 8 percentage points of GDP, but it has remained broadly stable in the US. 
These differences are much more important when labour taxes are considered. Tax revenues 
obtained from labour income (social security contributions plus personal income taxes on 
labour income) in the EU represent more than 20% of GDP while in the US they amount to 
only about 15% of GDP. Moreover, the observed increase in the tax burden on labour sharply 
compares with the developments observed in capital and consumption taxes. In terms of the 
total labour income, the tax burden on labour in the EU increased from 25% in 1970 to the 
current ratio close to 40%. The tax burden on capital has increased in the EU only by around 3 
percentage points over the last thirty years (from below 20% at the beginning of the seventies), 
while that on consumption remained practically unchanged at 20%. In the other side of the 
Atlantic, the tax burden on labour also increased, but only  by 6 percentage points (from 17% 
in the 1970s), but those on capital and consumption fell by around 10pp and 3pp, respectively. 
                                                                                                                                                         
2  Small structural deficits may be only allowed in particular circumstances and on a temporary basis. 
3 Moreover, Buti et al (2002) argue that automatic fiscal stabilization may come at the expense of efficiency if it 
induces economic agents to delay their adjustment to shocks.  
   6 
Given the documented increase in taxation, especially on labor, one may infer that policy 
makers consider the tradeoff between the stabilization and efficiency to be favorable to the 
former. In this paper we argue, however, that such a tradeoff may not always be relevant. We 
present a simple AD-AS two-country model, to illustrate circumstances where a reduction in 
taxes can foster stabilization. We derive the following testable implication from the model: 
tax cuts can either increase or decrease volatility depending on the structure of the taxation 
system. Hence, lowering taxes for efficiency purposes may not cost in terms of stabilization. 
This implication is tested for countries over the period 1960-2000. The empirical model takes 
account of the endogeneity and omitted variables issues identified in the literature. We found 
acceptably robust evidence that the relationship between taxation and macroeconomic 
stability is not linear. The composition of public finances, in particular the tax mix, matters 
for output and price volatility. Distorting taxes might have negative effects on macroeconomic 
stability. Consequently, the potential trade off between stability and flexibility might not exist. 
The analysis implies that a reduction in the tax burden might carry a "double dividend" of 
efficiency gains and better fiscal stabilization properties. This should be encouraging for 
countries with high tax burdens that are considering a reduction in the size of the public sector.   
The rest of the paper is articulated along five sections. First, the AD-AS model for two 
countries in a monetary union is analyzed. Then, section 3 presents a number of stylized facts 
on output and price volatility and on the size of the public sector. Section 4 presents the main 
findings of the econometric analysis in which output and price volatility is explained not only 
in function of the total tax burden but also in terms of the structure of taxation. Finally, 
section 5 recapitulates.    7 
2. THE MODEL  
In the standard AD-AS model, fiscal policy only affects the macroeconomic equilibrium 
through aggregate demand. Hence, automatic stabilizers stabilize output in the presence of 
both demand and supply shocks. Furthermore, automatic stabilizers also stabilize prices in 
presence of a demand shock. However, non-discretionary fiscal policy will be inflation 
destabilizing after a supply shock.  
Fatas and Mihov (2001), using robust empirical analyses, have tested the relationship between 
the average size of government (as measured by the share of government spending or taxes in 
total output) and the volatility of business cycles. Their results lent strong support to the 
notion that larger governments have a stabilizing effect on output. They also examined the 
sensitivity of their results to inclusion of various control variables, to the de-trending method 
and to the endogeneity issue raised by Rodrik (1998). The later has suggested that there is 
endogeneity in the joint determination of overall economic volatility and the size of 
government spending. The results in Fatás and Mihov (2001) seem to be robust to differences 
in specifications, estimation techniques, sample periods, de-trending methods, and data sets. 
However, large governments may also have an impact on economic efficiency. As recently 
argued by Buti et al (2002), there are also negative supply-side effects involved in using 
automatic fiscal stabilizers. Automatic fiscal stabilization may induce people and businesses 
to delay their adjustment to shocks. Social security systems, labor market institutions and tax 
systems are behind such a delay. Because they smooth the adverse effect of a shock, they may 
make workers less concerned with such an effect. In this context, automatic stabilization may 
come at the expense of efficiency if it hinders the appropriate response to supply shocks. 
Policy makers may, therefore, face a crucial tradeoff between stabilization and efficiency:   8 
reducing the tax burden in order to enhance efficiency and fostering market flexibility may 
cost in terms of less demand smoothing via the automatic stabilizers.  
The existence of the above tradeoff has been questioned by Buti et al. (2002). They argued 
that there is a critical level of taxes beyond which a reduction in taxation may not only 
improve efficiency, but also render fiscal automatic stabilizers more effective. Specifically, 
the conventional view is challenged if the distorting effects of taxes are explicitly specified in 
the model, in particular if they are meant to affect the elasticity of the supply function. In this 
case, financing government spending through distorting taxation might destabilize output in 
the case of supply shocks. Moreover, fiscal policy would be price destabilizing not only in the 
event of a supply shock, but also after a demand shock. 
The basic tenet of the model is that automatic stabilizers operate not only on the demand side 
through their impact on disposable income, but also on the supply side. Distorting taxes affect 
the level of equilibrium unemployment and potential output. What is important in our analysis, 
however, is the impact of distorting taxes on the reaction of output to unexpected inflation, 
that is the slope – not the position - of the aggregate supply curve. A similar result is obtained 
by Hairault et al (2001) although their purpose is different. They used a dynamic stochastic 
imperfect competition model to show that introducing some distorting taxation increases both 
allocation efficiency and stabilization. The government is assumed to tax firms’ input (labor 
and capital) and to transfer tax revenues to households in a lump sum way. The welfare gain 
is that such a policy reduces the negative effect of market power on factor demand. They 
identified the optimal tax rate that maximizes welfare. The authors also showed that when 
households are averse to work hours' fluctuations, labor supply is increasing in tax (subsidy) 
rate.  
The modified AD-AS model is not the only conceptual framework where taxes have   9 
pervasive effects on output stability. Gali (1994) considers a real business cycle (RBC) model 
in which the government raises distorting taxes to finance –in a sustainable way- lump sum 
transfers and government purchases. The model, which is calibrated in order to reproduce 
stylized features of the US economy, is assumed to be affected by both transitory and 
permanent technology shocks. The effects of such supply shocks on output volatility are then 
simulated under alternative values of the tax rate and of government purchases, both in 
percentage of the output level. Output volatility is measured as the standard deviation of either 
the percent deviations of output from trend, or the percent output growth rates. In both cases, 
the author concludes that, for a given tax rate, the increase of government purchases will 
always reduce output volatility, whereas changes in the tax rate will generate changes in the 
same direction in output volatility, given a constant ratio of government purchases to output.  
 
The channels through which taxes destabilize output in the event of a supply shock have been 
explained by Galí (1994) on the basis of the effects of distorting taxation on the elasticity of 
labor supply. A higher tax rate would enhance the response of employment to a technology 
(supply) shock leading to a larger response of output. The reason is that distorting taxation 
lowers labor productivity. However, the mechanism underpinning the stabilizing effect of 
government purchases is just the opposite. An increase of government purchases leads to 
higher employment in the steady state and to a lower response of output to a technology shock.  
We consider a version of the standard AD-AS model of a monetary union composed of two 
countries and closed vis-à-vis the rest of the world (see Buti et al (2002)). The aggregate 
demand and Phillips supply curves for the home country are written as: 
(1)  () ( ) ( )
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where y is output, d is the budget deficit, π is inflation (‘
e’ reads ‘expected’), i is the nominal 
interest rate and t is the tax rate. y, d and t are expressed in terms of potential (baseline) output. 
ε
d and ε
s represent, respectively, uncorrelated temporary demand and supply shocks of zero 
mean. All the variables are percentage points deviations with respect to the baseline. φ1, 
φ2,φ3 ,φ4 ,ω and α are non-negative parameters. The same equations can be written for the 
foreign country (for which all variables are marked with ‘*’).  
Equation (1) assumes that fluctuations in aggregate demand depend on (changes in) the 
budget deficit, the real interest rate, competitiveness, foreign demand and a shock. Aggregate 
supply depends on inflation surprise and a shock. The difference here is that the slope of the 
supply function (2) depends on taxes.
 Hence, α captures the distorting effects of taxes on the 
supply curve. With α = 0,  the system (1) plus (2) becomes a standard model in which fiscal 
policy operates only through the demand while with α > 0  higher distorting taxes make the 
supply curve less elastic. In the appendix, we formally show how taxation could affect the 
elasticity of the Phillips curve and consequently the slope of the aggregate supply curve. 
To get the intuition that, with progressive taxes, the reaction of production to an inflation 
surprise is smaller the larger the tax burden, assume that workers pass through the cyclical 
variations in their tax burden at least partly onto employers. This is a “real wage resistance” 
hypothesis which was confirmed by Daveri and Tabellini (2000) for continental Europe. 
However, Layard (1997) found that in the long-run tax neutrality holds, but, given that what is 
crucial for our analysis is real wage resistance in the short run, our analysis is not 
incompatible with long run neutrality of taxes. Take the case of a positive inflation surprise. 
As employers demand more labour to increase production, they will have to pay higher wages 
to cover not only for the higher prices but also on account of the fact that wages move up onto 
a higher tax bracket; this tends to limit the rise in production   11 
 
Aggregate demand and supply equations are complemented with the policy rules followed by 
the fiscal and monetary authorities. The central bank aims at stabilizing inflation and output 
of the currency area as a whole. We posit a simple Taylor rule of the form: 
(3)  y i β π + =  
where  ()
* 1 π λ λπ π − + =  and  ()
* 1 y y y λ λ − + =  are, respectively, the average inflation and 
output gap of the currency area (λ and 1-λ being the weights of the domestic and the foreign 
countries in the area) and β is the relative preference of the monetary authority for output over 
inflation stabilization. We assume that the monetary authority sets interest rates so as to 
maintain inflation on target in the “medium run”, which, in this simple setting, means in 
absence of shocks. Since shocks – regardless of whether they are symmetric or country-
specific – are serially uncorrelated with zero average, this implies   0
* = =
e e π π .  
For the fiscal authority, we assume that the two governments pursue a neutral discretionary 
policy, which implies that they set a target for the structural budget balance and let automatic 
stabilizers play symmetrically over the cycle
4. The deviation of the actual budget balance 
from the baseline (the latter being structural balance in absence of shocks) is: 
(4)  ty d − =  
Trade balance consistency implies: 
(5)  () 5
* * φ π π y y − = −  
                                                 
4  This is the definition of a well behaved” fiscal authority, according to Alesina et al. (2001). For more 
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Replacing (3), (4) and (5) in (1) and combining it with equation (2) gives the following semi-
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Inflation can be readily computed by equating (6) and (2) under π
e=0. 
We turn now to the analysis of shocks, focusing on asymmetric shocks (in the home country). 
We are interested in analyzing the effects of distorting taxes on the degree of stabilization in 




Abstracting from the foreign economy (i.e. φ3=φ4=φ6 =0), one can easily check that if there is 
no distorting effect of taxes on the supply curve (i.e. α=0), output is always stabilized and the 
higher is t the larger will be the stabilization. In contrast, if there is a distorting effect of taxes 
on the supply curve (i.e. α>0), output is less stabilized than in the previous case. Moreover, 
there may exist a level of α such that a higher t even induces output destabilization. In order to 
illustrate this, let’s examine the impact of a change in t on output. We combine (6) with its 
corresponding equation for the foreign country to get a reduced form. Then, we take the 
partial derivative of the reduced form w.r.t. t to find:  
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Higher distorting taxes t are stabilizing if the coefficient of ε
s in (7) is negative. The sign 
however is ambiguous and depends on the size of α.  It is easy to check that the derivative is 
negative for very small values of α and may become positive for very high values of α. Hence, 
if the distorting effect of taxes on supply is large enough, an increase in taxes may become 
output destabilizing. It follows that the impact of tax cuts on output stabilization depends on 
the distortion effect of taxes on the supply curve.  
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Since the coefficient of ε
s is always positive, an increase in t is inflation destabilizing. 
We turn now to the case of a demand shock in the home country (ε
s=0, ε
d≠0). The partial 
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As the coefficient of ε
d is negative, increasing t is always output stabilizing in the event of a 
demand shock. 
























φ φ α ω α



























φ φ α ω
α ω
 
The sign of the derivative may be positive or negative depending on α. Again, one can show 
that the impact of tax cuts on inflation stabilization depends on the distortion effect of taxes 
on the supply curve. 
 
Coming back to the RBC model in Galí (1994), although its conceptual framework is not 
directly comparable with that of the modified AD-AS, their respective predictions are not 
unapproachable. On the one hand, in the RBC model, the relationship between fiscal policy 
and output volatility under ‘technological’ (supply) shocks seems to be basically continuous, 
and predicts a negative, but very small, relationship between government size and 
macroeconomic stability. On the other hand, in the modified AD-AS model, such a 
relationship seems to be non linear. Governments (taxes) become output destabilizing in the 
event of supply shocks for certain values of α . In particular, the destabilizing effect of the tax 
rate depends on trade openness. More closed economies seem to afford higher average taxes 
without destabilizing output in the event of supply shocks. It happens to be that the RBC 
model in Galí (1994) is calibrated for the US, a large and (almost) closed economy with a 
relatively small government. Therefore, in the light of the modified AD-AS model, it is not 
surprising that the potential pervasive effect of the US government on macroeconomic 
stability is negligible. 
This is not the conclusion in Buti et al. (2002), who set up the modified AD-AS two-country 
model of a monetary union to derive the critical level of taxes beyond which a reduction in 
taxation may not only yield better efficiency, but also less volatility. They relied on 
simulations with OECD’s INTERLINK model to provide some empirical support to the 
existence of such a critical level. However, for the existence or absence of such a tradeoff to   15 
be consistently examined one needs to rely on the observation of the real world. This is the 
purpose of the econometric analysis below. 
 
3. MACROECONOMIC STABILITY IN THE OECD, 1960-2000 
Table 1 shows several indicators of output and price volatility in 25 OECD countries over the 
period 1960-2000. The first one is the standard deviation of annual real GDP growth in 
percentage points. Column (2) shows the standard deviation of the output gap expressed in 
percentage points of trend GDP (H-P filtered). Although the two of them are the traditional 
measures of output volatility used in the literature (Galí, 1994, and Fatás and Mihov, 2001), 
we will mainly refer to the second one in the rest of the paper because both lead to equivalent 
and comparable results
5, while the GDP gap seems to be a more standard indicator of cyclical 
output. Table 1 suggests that the degree of dispersion across the sample is relatively wide 
either in terms of annual real GDP growth or in terms of output gap. The proportion between 
the lowest and the highest value is greater than 2 in both cases. France, together with Belgium, 
Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, Norway and Australia are at the lower end 
of the scale for the standard deviation of the output gap (below 2%). At the opposite extreme, 
in Germany, Greece, Japan, Korea, and New Zealand the standard deviation of the output gap 
over the period 1960-2000 is greater than 3%. 
                                                 
5 This is mentioned by both Galí (1994) and Fatás and Mihov (2001) and also applies to this paper. For instance, 
the correlation coefficient between columns (1) and (2) in table 1 is 0.91, so results for GDP-gap volatility are 
broadly applicable to GDP-growth volatility (results available on request).   16 
 
Table 1: Output and price volatility (*) 

























  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Belgium 2,03 1,75 2,67 4,24  0,63 2,89 
Denmark  2,43 1,82 3,37 6,27  0,54 3,42 
Germany  3,23 3,10 1,89 3,42  0,55 1,79 
Greece  4,42 3,29 7,93  11,69  0,68 7,84 
Spain  2,89 2,45 5,13 8,82  0,58 5,38 
France  1,89 1,44 3,67 5,49  0,67 3,85 
Ireland  2,93 2,81 5,48 7,51  0,73 5,62 
Italy  2,30 1,62 5,92 8,53  0,69 5,88 
Luxemb. 3,47 2,92 4,27 4,43  0,96 2,78 
Netherl. 1,89 1,84 2,88 4,25  0,68 2,68 
Austria  1,91 1,79 2,07 3,95  0,52 2,11 
Portugal 3,19 3,26 7,92  10,62  0,75 8,57 
Finland  3,01 3,59 4,40 6,56  0,67 4,40 
Sweden  2,08 1,87 3,49 5,98  0,58 3,56 
UK  1,98 2,06 5,39 6,93  0,78 5,02 
US  2,17 2,04 2,47 4,04  0,61 2,57 
Japan 3,74  3,24  4,12 3,95  1,04 4,21 
Canada  2,21 2,12 3,43 4,66  0,74 3,14 
Switzer. 2,65 2,65 2,45 3,72  0,66 2,37 
Norway 1,70 1,78 3,87 5,71  0,68 2,97 
Island  3,98  4,03 17,89  20,87  0,86 20,63 
Mexico  3,58  3,51 29,74  27,67  1,07 30,52 
Korea
(7) 3,86 3,51 7,74  10,03  0,77 8,26 
Australia  2,10 1,83 4,37 5,77  0,76 4,22 
New  Z.  3,24 3,25 6,39 7,11  0,90 5,84 
The values in columns (1), (3) and (6) are standard deviations of annual growth rates. Column (2) is the 
standard deviation of the output gap in percentage points of trend GDP. Column (4) is the average 
annual growth rate of the GDP deflator in percentage points. Column (5) is the ratio between (3) and 
(7) Standard deviations and averages are calculated over the period 1960-2000 in all the countries, 
except for output growth and the output gap in Korea, where the sample period is 1970-2000. 
Source: AMECO (DG ECFIN) and OECD (Economic Indicators) and own calculations. 
   17 
 
The standard deviations of the annual growth rates of the GDP deflator and of the consumer 
price index (CPI) are shown in columns (3) and (6) respectively. In accordance with the 
indicator of output volatility we should use one of such standard deviations as indicators of 
price stability. In particular, we would select the first one since both are almost identical
6, 
while in most theoretical models prices implicitly or explicitly refer to the GDP deflator. 
However, as shown in column (4), in statistical terms, the standard deviation and the mean are 
in this case almost identical. The correlation coefficient between columns (3) and (4) is 0.979, 
so that analyzing the standard deviation of inflation rates would be equivalent to analyzing 
average inflation. If we assume that the latter is positively correlated with the inflation target 
in the long run, it would turn out that analyzing column (3) would look like explaining long-
run inflation targets rather than price stability over the cycle. Therefore, we use an indicator of 
price stability that avoids these problems. This is the indicator in column (5), which expresses 
price volatility as the ratio between the standard deviation and the mean. On this basis, the 
dispersion of price stability has no ‘long-run inflation-scale effects’ and is comparable to that 
of output stability
7. The proportion between the lowest and the highest variation coefficient is 
close to 2. At the lower end of the scale (below 0.6) we find Denmark, Germany, Spain, 
Austria, or Sweden, while in Mexico and Japan the standard deviation is close to the mean
8. 
On the basis of table 1, it is difficult to find clear patterns in the cross-country differences in 
output and price stability. The consideration of some additional indicators at country level 
sheds some light on the determinants of macroeconomic stability. Within the framework of 
                                                 
6 The correlation coefficient between columns (3) and (4) is 0.9955. 
7 Note that the average of the output gap is by construction close to zero in every country, so that the standard 
deviation of the output gap does is not affected by the scale of its average.  
8 Note that, in accordance with the modified AD-AS model, this refers to the magnitude of price fluctuations and 
does not necessarily imply any judgement about price stability in the usual sense of discipline. We assume that 
policy authorities set up the long-run inflation target in each country according to its own preferences. So, a 
country may by a high-inflation country and still be price-stable according to our definition. As in Buti et al   18 
this paper, the government size, the rate or rates of distorting taxes, the size of the country or 
the openness to international competition seem to be among the most clear candidates. Table 
2 presents for each country the average values over the period 1960-2000 of four alternative 
measures of government size (total expenditures, current expenditures, total revenues and tax 
revenues, all in percentage points of GDP), a measure of trade openness (the average of total 
exports and imports in percentage points of GDP) and a measure of country size (GDP in 
1995 purchasing power parities, expressed in percentage points of the US GDP).  
                                                                                                                                                         
(2002), we are only interested in knowing about the determinants of the deviations between actual and target 
inflation rates in the long run.   19 
Table 2: Government and country size and trade openness (*) 
















Belgium  49,4  43,9  41,4  45,6  3,1  58,6 
Denmark  48,3 49,1 46,7 45,1  1,8  31,7 
Germany  44,4 43,3 40,2 39,0 22,4 23,9 
Greece  35,0 30,7 27,4 29,1  2,0  20,0 
Spain
(4)   32,9 30,8 28,6 27,7  8,1  16,7 
France  45,9 44,7 42,7 40,5 16,8 19,0 
Ireland  42,4 36,5 34,3 35,4  0,8  50,9 
Italy  43,3 36,0 35,7 39,3 16,0 19,6 
Luxemb. 38,6 42,4 40,6 33,4  0,2  58,6 
Netherl. 48,0 46,2 42,7 43,0  4,5  49,4 
Austria  48,8 47,3 40,6 40,9  2,3  33,5 
Portugal 33,0 30,7 25,2 28,1  1,7  28,5 
Finland  43,5 45,9 38,7 36,7  1,4  26,8 
Sweden  53,5 55,7 48,8 47,1  2,7  29,3 
UK  42,8 40,6 35,8 37,9 15,8 24,7 
US  32,7 30,3 26,4 29,8  100,0 8,3 
Japan 28,8  27,3  23,9 22,4 35,4 10,4 
Canada  40,7 38,5 27,7 37,3  9,0  25,8 
Switzerl.  46.0 N/A N/A N/A  2.8  32,9 
Norway 42,2 38.0 46,1 39,0  1.3  37.0 
Island  39,3 35,1 37,5 32,5  0.1  35,8 
Mexico  N/A N/A N/A N/A  1.4  16,1 
Korea
(4) 19,0 20,2 17,3 13,8  6,7  32,0 
Australia  31,0 28,4 25,8 29,0  5,0  16,4 
New Z.
(4)  43,3 42,2 35,6 40,3  0,9  27,4 
(*) The values in the table are averages over the period 1960-2000 
(1) In percentage of nominal GDP. We have assumed that Belgium and Luxembourg have the same 
degree of trade openness 
(2) The period starts in 1970 or later in Denmark, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Finland, Korea and New Zealand. Therefore in these countries the figure for total 
taxes may not be comparable to the figure for total revenues 
(3) US = 100 
(4) The period starts in the mid-1960s in Spain, in the early 1970s in Korea and in the mid-1980s in 
New Zealand. 
Source: AMECO (DG ECFIN) and OECD (Economic Indicators) and own calculations. 
 
As a general rule, EU countries have larger governments in terms of total and current 
expenditure. The exceptions are Greece, Spain and Portugal, where the size of expenditure is 
comparable to that of the US. Unsurprisingly, governments are larger in most EU countries 
also in terms of total revenues
9, and, accordingly, EU countries have higher average tax rates, 
as measured by the ratio of total tax revenues to GDP. Leaving aside Germany, France, Italy, 
                                                 
9 As is well known, public deficits have been high and persistent in EU countries, especially since the mid-1970s. 
This is the reason why revenues do not match expenditures even in the very long term (40 years).   20 
the UK, Japan and, to a lesser extent, Spain and Canada, most countries are very small by US 
standards. Most small countries (Belgium-Luxembourg, Ireland, the Netherlands, Austria, 
Norway, Korea) are relatively open economies, while large countries, such as the US or Japan 
trade much less in terms of GDP
10. 
 
























0.54*        
Total 
expend. 
-0.45*  -0.41*       
Current 
expend. 
-0.50*  -0.39*  0.99*      
Total 
revenue 
-0.40* -0.36 0.95* 0.93*       
Tax 
revenue 
-0.44* -0.38 0.94* 0.91* 0.96*     
Trade 
Openness 
-0.03 -0.12 0.40* 0.34 0.46*  0.45*   
Country 
Size (8) 
-0.35 -0.15 -0.21 -0.19 -0.29 -0.26  -0.71* 
*  Significant at 5%. Asymptotic critical value between 2x(1/25)
0.5 = 0.40 and 2x(1/22)
0.5 = 0.43 
(1) Standard deviation of the output gap in percentage of trend GDP over 1960-2000
(a) 
(2) The ratio between the standard deviation and the average over 1960-2000
(a) of the annual 
percentage change in the GDP deflator 
(3) Logarithm of the average total expenditures (% of GDP) over 1960-2000
(a) 
(4) Logarithm of the average current expenditures (% of GDP) over 1960-2000
(a) 
(5) Logarithm of the average total revenues (% of GDP) over 1960-2000
(a) 
(6) Logarithm of the average tax revenues (% of GDP) over 1960-2000
(a) 
(7) Logarithm of the average exports and imports (half % of GDP) over 1960-2000
(a) 
(8) Logarithm of the average GDP (PPPs) over 1960-2000
(a) 
(a)  See footnotes in tables 1 and 2 for the exceptions. 
 
Table 3 presents simple correlation coefficients between columns (2) and (5) of table 1 
(output-gap and inflation volatility), and the columns in table 2. The results suggest a negative 
correlation between output volatility and the size of governments, whatever the indicator 
considered. Indeed, this is explained by the fact that total expenditures, current expenditures, 
                                                 
10  This would also be the case of Germany, France or Italy if intra-EU trade were excluded. Still, when 
comparing such large EU countries with other Member States it becomes clear that they are relatively closed 
economies.   21 
total revenues and tax revenues are in the long run four different aspects of the same 
phenomenon
11, which we refer to here as the size of the public sector. The results for the 
relationship between price stability and government size are much more ambiguous. As a 
matter of fact, while in the case of output stability the correlation coefficients are in absolute 
value greater than the critical value, in the case of price volatility the correlation coefficients 
are much closer to, or even below, the critical value. The table also stresses the strong 
association between government size and trade openness, as well as that between the latter 
indicator and country size. Overall, larger public sectors and lower output volatility go hand 
in hand, as do government size and trade openness, while larger countries have the tendency 
to be less open to international competition. 
The above evidence is, however, still anecdotal. For consistent conclusions to be drawn, one 
should use adequate econometric tools to examine the relationships between government size 
and macroeconomic stability. This is the purpose of the next section. 
  
4. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
Before investigating the implication of the theoretical model in Section 2, we should 
determine a basic specification for output and inflation volatility. Such a basic specification 
should in particular take account of endogeneity and omitted variables problems which can 
bias the relationships between government size and macroeconomic stability. 
 
4.1 Preliminary analysis  
Both problems, endogeneity and omitted variables, have been extensively discussed by Fatas 
and Mihov (2001) within the framework of the relationship between government size and 
output stabilization. Regarding omitted variables, one can not exclude that third factors affect 
                                                 
11 In the very long run the four indicators should move together.   22 
both volatility and government size. Neglecting such a possibility can bias the estimates in 
either direction. To deal appropriately with this issue we consider two control variables which 
have proved to be important in Fatas and Mihov (2001): openness and country size. The 
inclusion of the former is based on Rodrik (1998) argument that because governments reduce 
volatility in the economy, one should expect that more open economies, which are by 
implication more volatile, will tend to have larger governments. The inclusion of the later was 
rationalized by Fatas and Mihov (2001) on the grounds that if there are fixed costs in setting 
up governments, then a large economy will have a relatively small government. On this basis, 
table 4 presents regression results of output and price volatility on tax revenues, trade 
openness and country size (the three of them in logarithms).  
Where output volatility is concerned, the table illustrates some fundamental points made in 
the literature. According to Rodrick (1994), and corroborated by Fatás and Mihov (2001), a 
simple regression between output volatility and government size would be biased towards 
zero. The absolute value of the coefficient of government size unambiguously increases when 
including trade openness. Additionally, the table indicates that output volatility increases with 
trade openness. However, the coefficient of this variable is only significant at 10%.  
According to table 3, there is a strong and negative correlation between country size and trade 
openness. This could suggest that country size is a very important determinant of volatility, 
while trade openness is, to a large extent, determined by the size of the domestic market. This 
assumption is supported by table 4, which shows that the inclusion of country size further 
reduces the potential bias of government size, while significantly increasing the explicative 
power of the model. Moreover, its coefficient is significant at 1% and negative.
12 Larger 
economies would be less volatile because their big domestic markets would largely cushion 
the effects of external shocks. Given the same size of the public sector larger economies are 
                                                 
12 Note that the coefficient of openness becomes non significant when country size is introduced.    23 
less volatile than small countries. This supports the theoretical finding of the modified AD-AS 
model that the tax rate above which fiscal policy destabilizes output is higher in large 
economies. Table 4 suggests that a large economy has more room for compensating potential 
destabilizing effects of tax distortions or, in other words, that, for becoming output-
destabilizing, governments have to be bigger in large economies than in small ones. 
 Regressions GDV1 to GDV4 in table 4 also indicate a negative correlation between price 
volatility and government size. However, the relationship is much weaker in this case. The 
coefficients are only significant at 5% or 10% and the maximum adjusted R² is only 20%. Yet, 
the conclusions are comparable to those for output volatility. Large governments reduce price 
volatility, while the deviations between actual and target inflation tend to be lower in large 
countries. Overall, table 4 seems to suggest that the combination of large domestic markets 
and large public sectors unambiguously lowers output volatility and, albeit to a lesser extent, 
inflation deviations from target. 
    24 
Table 4: Regressions for output-gap and inflation volatility 








































































Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in parenthesis; *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%, 
* significant at 10%. 
(1)  Logarithm of the average tax revenues (% of GDP) over 1960-2000
(a) 
(2)  Logarithm of the average exports and imports (half % of GDP) over 1960-2000
(a) 
(3)  Logarithm of the average GDP (PPPs) over 1960-2000
(a) 
(4)  Standard deviation of the output gap in percentage of trend GDP over 1960-2000
(a) 
(5)  Ratio between the standard deviation and the average over 1960-2000
(a) of the annual percentage 
change in the GDP deflator 
 
(a) See footnotes in tables 1 and 2 for the exceptions 
 
 
Yet, the simple inclusion of control variables might not totally offset the bias due endogeneity. 
If governments stabilize business cycles, economies that are inherently more volatile might 
end up choosing larger governments. Here, there is a simultaneity issue and the inclusion of 
control variables does not solve the problem. Unless adequate instruments for government 
size are used the estimate will be biased. Table 5 looks at both omitted variables and 
simultaneity problems. Where simultaneity is concerned, we follow the main stream of the 
literature on the determination of the size of the public sector (see Fatás and Mihov, 2001, and 
Martinez-Mongay, 2002, and the references therein) and choose as the main determinants of   25 
government size per capita income (in 1995 PPPs), the old-age dependency ratio (people 65 
or older in percentage of total population) and trade openness (see table 2) . 
13These three 
variables, expressed in logarithms, will be used as instruments to re-estimate our preferred 
regressions of table 4. We use the Generalized Method of Moments and jointly estimate the 
output and inflation equations. Given that their error terms are likely to be correlated, joint 
estimation will improve the efficiency of the estimators.  
Rows OG-IV1 and GD-IV1 in table 5 are respectively regressions OGV3 and GDV3 in table 
4 re-estimated by the instrumental variable (IV) methods. These have turned to be acceptable 
specifications for output-gap and inflation volatility. According to the J-test for over-
identifying restrictions, it cannot be rejected that the set of instruments are pre-determined 
variables, while there are no significant changes either in the estimations or in the adjustment 
when one compares tables 4 and 5.  
The other regressions in the table explore the explicative power of one additional indicator: 
the share of manufacturing gross value added in total GDP. This is a measure of production 
specialization. The results suggest that a higher specialization in manufacturing, the sector 
most exposed to international competition, is associated with higher output volatility.  
 
  
                                                 
13 Indicators of the political system have been proposed by Persson and Tabellini (1999) and applied by Fatás 
and Mihov (2001) to a small sample of OECD countries, where such political indicators do not seem to be 
significant. Consequently, we do not included here either. Another factor, also proposed in the literature 
(Martinez-Mongay, 2002) but not included here is the stock of public debt. Although for panels including five-
year averages public debt is a relevant determinant. However, our analyses suggest that for longer periods the 
results (available on request) are less unambiguous. We have opted to consider debt later on as an additional 
factor explaining output volatility.   26 





















































Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in parenthesis; *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%, 
* significant at 10%. All the regressions include an intercept not shown here 
(1)  Logarithm of the average tax revenues (% of GDP) over 1960-2000
(a) 
(2)  Logarithm of the average GDP (PPPs) over 1960-2000
(a) 
(3)  Average share of manufacturing gross value added in total GDP over 1960-2000 
(4)  Test for over-identifying restrictions; p-value between ‘[]’ 
(5)  Standard deviation of the output gap in percentage of trend GDP over 1960-2000
(a) 
(6)  The instruments are trade openness (% of GDP), per capita GDP (1995 PPPs) and the dependency 
ratio (% of total population). The three instruments are the logs of the averages over 1960-2000.  
(7)  Ratio between the standard deviation and the average over 1960-2000
(a) of the annual percentage 
change in the GDP deflator 
 
(a) See footnotes in tables 1 and 2 for the exceptions 
 
4.2 Automatic stabilization and the structure of taxation  
 
Tables 3 to 5 present quite robust empirical evidence of a negative relationship between 
government size and output-gap and price volatility: larger public sectors stabilize output and 
reduce inflation fluctuations. Yet, one could wonder whether such a relationship is 
independent of the tax-mix. Two identical countries in terms of GDP, production structure 
and government size, could have different tax-mix, thereby exhibiting different elasticities of 
labor supply. The theoretical analysis in section 2 has shown that the stabilizing/destabilizing 
impacts of taxes depend on the distorting effect of taxes on the supply curve. With an 
important distorting effect the destabilization impact might be the dominant one (especially 
under supply shocks).  
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Table 6: Labor related tax burden over time and countries   
 





























Belgium   11.62 11.31 34.28 16.83 16.26 42.90 5.21 4.95 8.62 
Denmark  24.06 1.81 32.35 28.70 2.55 41.32 4.64 0.74 8.97 
Germany  11.33 13.03 35.21 11.87 17.90 40.71 0.54 4.87 5.49 
Greece  3.30 7.67 14.94 6.27 11.94 23.40 2.97 4.26 8.46 
Spain  3.71 8.76 17.45 9.26 13.01 28.54 5.55 4.25 11.09 
France  6.20 15.18 29.86 8.90 20.11 39.30 2.69 4.93 9.45 
Ireland  9.41 4.88 14.89 13.70 6.85 24.65 4.29 1.97 9.76 
Italy  6.14 11.38 22.90 13.93 14.10 34.88 7.79 2.72 11.98 
Luxembourg  15.36 11.53 30.16 17.06 12.54 33.53 1.70 1.01 3.37 
The Netherlands  14.45 16.05 36.90 13.58 18.29 40.92 -0.88 2.24 4.03 
Austria  10.23 11.20 29.09 12.42 16.23 37.31 2.18 5.03 8.22 
Portugal   4.86 5.30 14.40 8.66 9.87 24.08 3.80 4.57 9.68 
Finland  13.35 6.78 31.17 17.25 12.63 41.42 3.90 5.85 10.25 
Sweden  18.42 9.06 41.23 21.18 14.33 47.67 2.76 5.27 6.44 
United Kingdom   15.12 6.33 24.94 15.95 7.83 25.35 0.83 1.50 0.41 
United States   13.29 4.60 18.35 13.09 7.00 22.00 -0.20 2.40 3.65 
Japan  8.30 4.72 13.15 11.12 8.94 20.14 2.82 4.22 6.99 
 
1:Direct taxes in percentage points of GDP 
2:Social security contributions in percentage points of GDP 
3:Labour effective tax rates in % of the tax base  
From an econometric point of view, the implication of the theoretical analysis is that the 
coefficient of government size in the output and inflation volatility equations, instead of being 
constant, may be dependent on the importance of the distorting effect of taxes. For a given 
government size, the higher is the distorting effect the higher could be the destabilization 
effect. Let’s label the coefficient of government size η, if the implication of the theoretical 
model fits with the observation of the real world then η=( η0 + η1*indicator of the distorting 
effect of taxes). The expected sign of η0 is negative and the expected sign of η1 is positive. 
We consider two ways of testing the impact of higher distorting taxes on stabilization. One 
consists of estimating the relationship over periods of time that are characterized by different   28 
levels of distorting taxes. The other consists of estimating the equation over the whole period 
but interacting the coefficient of government with an indicator of distorting taxes. 
To implement the first test, we look at averages over the periods 1960-1980 and 1980-2000. 
We then run a pooled regression over the resulting two samples with an interaction time 
dummy (equal to 1 for the second period and 0 for the first) and government size.  On the 
basis of three labor-tax indicators, table 6 illustrates the significant increase recorded by the 
tax burden on labor over the two periods. 
To implement the second test we use the average over the whole period 1960-2000 and 
interact government size with the labor effective tax rate.  Following Mendoza et al (1997) 
and Kneller et al (1999), the labor effective tax rate is the best indicator of distorting taxes. 
Moreover, Li and Sarte (2004) show that the share of tax revenue (or social security) over 
GDP constitutes a poor proxy for average marginal tax rates. Hence, as a further robustness 
check we also interact government size with direct taxes in percentage of GDP and social 
security contributions in percentage of GDP. The statistically insignificant coefficients of the 
two interaction terms are interpreted as an additional support to the importance of the 
distorting taxes.  
 
 
Table 7 presents the results of both tests. Starting with the one using the time dummy and 
averages over two periods, one notices that the average quality of fit is of medium to low 
levels for inflation and output volatility. For the latter, all coefficients are significant 
(sometimes highly) with the expected sign while for the former two coefficients (out of four) 
are significant and only at the 10% level. Although the results seem better with output than 
with inflation volatilities, the interactions term is significant and positive in both cases. This   29 
implies that over the second period government size has had a less stabilizing effect of 
volatilities, which is in accordance with our expectations. 
Turning to the test with an explicit indicator of the distorting effect of taxes, we first observe 
that the inflation volatility equation again performs poorly in terms of quality of fit. In 
contrast the quality of fit with output volatility is high, especially when the labor tax rate is 
interacted with government size. In this case all coefficients are significant with the expected 
sign. In particular, consistently with the prediction of the theoretical model, the coefficient of 
the interaction term is positive implying that the higher is the distorting effect of taxes the 
lower is the stabilizing effect of government size on output. Moreover, neither the 
specification incorporating the interaction term with direct taxes nor the one incorporating the 
interaction term with social security exhibits a significant coefficient of such terms.
14 As 
stated above, while the labor effective tax rate is a good indicator of distorting taxes 
(Mendoza et al (1997) and Kneller et al (1999)), tax revenue (or social security) over GDP 
constitutes a poor proxy for such taxes (Li and Sarte (2004)). Hence, the fact that the 
coefficients of the corresponding inter-action terms are not significant is consistent with our 
analysis.   
Overall, the results lend support to the possible destabilizing effects of the tax mix. Where 
output volatility is concerned, the results suggest that high labor tax rates have perverse 
effects on output stability. Ceteris paribus (given government and country sizes, and the 
relative importance of manufacturing), output fluctuations will be larger in the countries with 
higher tax rates on labor. This result is in line with the basic assumption of the modified AD-
AS model, namely that the labor supply is affected by the labor tax wedge, which in turn 
affects the supply function and makes it steeper. 
                                                 
14 Their overall quality of fit is also 8 percentage points lower than the one with labor tax rate.   30 
Table 7: Macroeconomic stability and the tax mix 
 
 
Output-gap volatility (1)  Price volatility [GDP deflator] (2) 
          
-2.44  -4.9  -2.58  -2.55 -0.31  -0.17  -0.46  -0.43
(0.56)***  (1.41)***  (0.62)***  (0.59)*** (0.18)*  (0.36)  (0.14)***  (0.14)***
Government Size (3) 
           
-0.23  -0.34  -0.29  -0.29 -0.03  -0.04  -0.04  -0.05
(0.05)***  (0.08)***  (0.09)***  (0.09)*** (0.03)  (0.02)*  (0.02)**  (0.02)**
Country size (4) 
           
1.43  1.04  0.85  0.86 0.07  0.21  0.23  0.23
(0.75)*  (0.46)**  (0.49)*  (0.49)* (0.22)  (0.12)*  (0.11)*  (0.12)**
Specialization (5) 
           
0.20      0.05     
(0.09)**      (0.03)*     
Government Size* 
Time dummy (6) 
           
1.45      -0.16   
(0.81)*      (0.21)   
Government Size* 
Labor rate (7) 
         
  0.03        0.05 
  (0.30)        (0.06) 
Government Size* 
Direct taxes (8) 
           
      -0.03       0.00
      (0.30)       (0.07)
Government Size* 
Social Security (9) 
           
A-R² (10)  0.34  0.64  0.56  0.56 0.27  0.39  0.39  0.38
3.76  7.79  8.53  8.80 3.76  7.79  8.53  8.80 J (11) 
[0.43]  [0.45]  [0.38]  [0.36] [0.43]  [0.45]  [0.38]  [0.36]
Models estimated by IV methods (instruments: trade openness, per capita GDP, dependency ratio. Heteroskedastic-consistent 
standard errors in parenthesis; *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. All the regressions include an 
intercept not shown here. 
(1)  Standard deviation of the output gap in percentage of trend GDP over 1960-2000
(a).  
(2)  The ratio between the standard deviation and the average over 1960-2000
(a) of the annual percentage change in the 
GDP deflator.  
(3)  Logarithm of the average tax revenues (% of GDP) over 1960-2000
(a).  
(4)  Logarithm of the average GDP (PPPs) over 1960-2000
(a).  
(5)  Average share of manufacturing gross value added in total GDP over 1960-2000.  
(6)  The corresponding equation is estimated on a sample consisting of averages over the period 1960-1980 and the period 
1981-2000. The resulting number of observation is 30. Government size is interacted with a dummy taking the value 1 
over the second period and 0 otherwise.  
(7)  The corresponding equation is estimated on a sample consisting of averages over the period 1960-2000. The resulting 
number of observation is 17. Government size is interacted with labor taxes in percentage of total labor costs.  
(8)  The corresponding equation is estimated on a sample consisting of averages over the period 1960-2000. The resulting 
number of observation is 17. Government size is interacted with direct taxes in percentage of GDP.  
(9)  The corresponding equation is estimated on a sample consisting of averages over the period 1960-2000. The resulting 
number of observation is 17. Government size is interacted with social security contribution in percentage of GDP. 
(10)  Adjusted R².  
(11)  Test for over-identifying restrictions; p-value between ‘[]’.  
 
(a)  See footnotes in tables 1 and 2 for the exceptions.   31 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS   
 
This paper has discussed theoretical evidence about the stabilizing role of fiscal policy and, in 
particular, about the potential trade-off between efficiency and stabilization. Although 
following the major strand of the literature on the relationship between the size of 
governments and output stability, the analysis also looked at price volatility.  
 
Within the standard framework, distorting taxes enhance output stability but have an impact 
on potential growth, so that a trade-off between stabilization and efficiency seems to arise. If 
there is a positive relationship between the size of automatic stabilizers and distorting taxation, 
any reform aiming at lowering distortions and enhancing efficiency will be at the expense of 
more macroeconomic volatility. However, the theoretical evidence discussed in this paper 
suggests that such a trade-off might not exist. As marginal tax rates increase in progressive 
regimes so do average rates. Within the modified AD-AS, or within the RBC model by Galí 
(1994), rising average tax rates enhance market distortions and reduce the stabilizing effects 
of public finances, so that when pursuing efficiency one also gets macroeconomic stability. 
 
On the empirical side, we have presented acceptably robust evidence that the size of 
governments in OECD countries has played a stabilizing role for both output and inflation. 
The econometric analysis has also revealed that larger countries have more closed economies, 
and thus are less affected by external shocks. Moreover, a larger manufacturing sector means 
a higher degree of exposure to international shocks, which have a pervasive effect on output 
stability.  
   32 
A central conclusion of the paper is that the relationship between government size and 
macroeconomic stability does not seem to be linear. The composition of public finances, in 
particular the tax mix, matters for output and price volatility. Distorting taxes, namely taxes 
on labor and capital, might have negative effects on macroeconomic stability. Consequently, 
the potential trade off between stability and flexibility might not exist. 
  
This debate about the stabilizing effects of fiscal policy is particularly relevant in EMU, 
where governments only have stability and flexibility to face the perverse effects of 
asymmetric shocks: fiscal stabilization to reduce macroeconomic fluctuations, and market 
flexibility to speed up price adjustment and structural change. If, as suggested by the standard 
model, there were a trade off between stability and flexibility, EMU would not provide 
governments with enough policy instruments to deal with idiosyncratic shocks. However, if 
such a trade off does not exist, fiscal reforms aiming at enhancing the functioning of markets 
would not hamper macroeconomic stability.   33 
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Appendix: 
The possible effect of taxation on the elasticity of the Phillips curve. 
 
Consider the following wage formation function: 
(1)  T L f w γ + = ) (   
where w is the real producer wage, L is employment and T is the real revenue of distorting tax 
per worker. We assume the first derivative of the function f with respect to L to be positive. 
We interpret γ as a coefficient of wage resistance: it varies between 0 (all tax increase are 
borne by labour) and 1 (tax increases are passed through entirely to employers). Rewriting in 










where ρ1 = (df/dL)(L/f(L)), which is the elasticity of the real wage with respect to (cyclical 
variations in) employment.  
Next, we define the average and marginal rates of the distorting tax as, respectively, 
w
T







= ′ . 
By replacing t and t’ in (2) and defining the tax elasticity with respect to wage earnings ξ as 












We assume the nominal rate of change of the producer wage to equal the expected rate of 
inflation (π
e) plus the rate of change of the real producer wage and that wages are fully passed 
into prices (i.e. 
e w π π + = & ). Moreover, we assume that for every percentage (cyclical) 
increase in employment, the unemployment rate declines by a ρ2 percentage points; i.e. 
L u u &
2 * ρ − = − , where u is unemployment and u* is the natural rate of unemployment. Under   36 
those assumptions the (inverse) expectations-augmented Phillips curve reads (we leave out 
other explanatory variables)
 15: 













− =  
and χ is a positive constant which is equal to the ratio of ρ2 and ρ1 . 
 
It is easy to see that, provided that taxes are progressive (that is ξ > 1) and there is sufficient 
wage resistance (i.e. a relatively large γ), the reaction of unemployment to an inflation 
surprise is smaller the larger the value of t
16. In other words, in countries with higher taxes, a 
value of inflation larger (smaller) than expected will lead to a smaller (larger) reaction of 
output which corresponds to a steeper supply function in the output-inflation space. The 
intuition for this result is clear. Take the case of a positive inflation surprise: as employers 
demand more labour to increase production, they will have to pay higher wages to cover not 
only for the higher prices but also on account of the fact that wages move up onto a higher tax 




                                                 
15 Taxation may also enter in the determination of the natural level of output (see Dixit and Lambertini, 2000), 
and not only in the slope of the supply function. Since we are interested in analyzing the response to shocks, this 
will not be considered.  
16 The condition to have this result is γ∗ξ>1. 
17 For this to hold true it must be assumed that governments fail to provide an offsetting tax break to moderate 
wage demands, i.e. do not pursue an incomes policy. But this is consistent with the basic assumption of our 
analysis: governments solely and fully rely on automatic stabilizers, hence do not modify the tax and spending 
parameters in response to cyclical fluctuations in economic activity. 